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1. Introduction
The global demand for biofuels is increasing rapidly. Such measures as the European Biofuel
Directive (2003/30/EC) promoting the use of biofuels for EU transport1 are giving an impulse
to the cultivation of soya, especially in Argentina, the source of most European biodiesel
imports. The EU goal of replacing fossil fuels with biofuels, combined with the growing
demand from China and the USA, is contributing to the expansion of soya for feed and fuel in
the Southern Cone, turning its countries into potential energy crops providers for Northern
markets. The soya frontier is rapidly expanding in Argentina and beyond its borders (e.g. in
Paraguay, Bolivia, Brazil and Uruguay).
Argentina is the world’s largest exporter of soya bean oil and soya meal (it supplies about 45
per cent of the world market) and the third largest exporter of soya beans, after the USA and
Brazil. Its main customers are China and the EU. Soya covers about 19 million ha of the
country’s territory, representing about 50% of Argentina’s total cultivated area. Over the last
15 years, genetically modified (GM) soya production has expanded dramatically. GM soya
was first grown in the central Pampean region, initially on pasture land and in rotation with
cattle wheat. Later, it was introduced to other regions, displacing other types of land use and
occupying land, increasingly at great cost to native forests and monte.2 ,3 Most of the soya
1 This Directive on the promotion of the use of biofuels and other renewable fuels for transport, which entered into force
in May 2003, stipulates that EU Member States countries must take national measures to replace 5.75% of all transport
fossil fuels (petrol and diesel) with biofuels by 2010.
2 Designates non-cultivated land with native vegetation that could include a range of types and density of trees, bushes
and plants, but also designates a full ecosystem, which are constitutive of peasant livelihoods in northern Argentina.
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produced today is GM.4 Soya production is now moving northwards, especially into the Chaco
region, and also towards other countries in South America. Conditions that made this
expansion possible included the dissemination of direct tillage technologies, favourable
international prices, changes in the scale and organization of agricultural companies (including
new forms of land administration and the concentration of control), and the availability of new
land through deforestation.5 Soya expansion was also promoted by the government as a ‘green’
way to increase foreign currency reserves and to boost rural development and energy self-
sufficiency.
This expansion of the soya frontier has many implications. It leads to land-use changes and
deforestation, for example in the Chaco region. Soya expansion entails the ‘monocultivation
of the land’ and the ‘soyization of the pampas and forest’. Production is extremely large scale
and capital intensive, which is especially a result of the introduction of zero-tillage techniques.
There are, however, also indirect effects. Small-scale farmers and indigenous communities are
affected, as are cattle and food producers, who are pushed away towards new zones. In
addition, the expansion of the soya frontier is more than simply a change of land use: it is a
basic transformation involving new technologies (zero-tillage techniques), new power
relations (large companies taking over), and a shift from labour-intensive to capital-intensive
production regimes, and is being accompanied by new dependencies (the reliance on a small
number of firms that provide agrochemical packages). The rapid expansion of the soya frontier
also puts pressure on the land, leading to speculation; it is also seen as a manifestation of land
grabbing.
This chapter is based on fieldwork carried out in Argentina in between 2011 and 2012. It
provides a critical analysis of the transformations that are taking place as a consequence of the
rapid expansion of soya. In it, we look at the features of the current and earlier soya expansion,
the actors involved and the consequences, especially for the Chaco region. More particularly,
we focus on the extent to which local populations are displaced and/or enclosed, and the role
of land governance and territorial planning in bringing the frontier under control.
2. The expansion of the soya frontier: How it happened
No other part of the world has devoted so much land to a single GM crop as Latin America.
In 2009, the area covered with GM soya in South America was around 40 million ha [2]. In
Argentina – the world’s largest exporter of soya oil and meal (supplying about 45% of the
world market) – more than 50 per cent of the agricultural land is covered with this crop,
reaching a production level of 54 million tons6 ,7 and covering an area of about 19 million ha
3 Paruelo, J.M, Oesterheld, M. Patrones espaciales y temporales de la expansión de Soja en Argentina. Relación con factores
socio-económicos y ambientales. LART / FAUBA (2005) http://www.agro.uba.ar/users/lart/bancomundial/
INFORME_final.pdf/ (accessed July 2012)
4 The legalization of Roundup Ready soya in Argentina in 1996 was followed by the illegal introduction of GM soya, first
in Brazil and Paraguay, and lately in Bolivia.
5 Parueloet al. (idem).
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(2009–10). After the USA and Brazil, Argentina is the world’s third largest soya bean producer;
it exports soya beans mainly to China and the EU.
In Argentina, the industrial production of soya started in the late 1970s in the ‘nucleus zone’
or pampas region, where it contributed to the intensification of land use: there was a shift from
labour-intensive cattle ranching and dairy activities to capital-intensive agricultural activities.
Figure 1. South American Chaco region
An important moment for the expansion of soya (and its incursion into neighbouring coun‐
tries) was 1996, when Argentina approved the production of GM soya,8 which at the time was
forbidden in all its neighbouring countries.9 ,10 By doing this, Argentina became an outlet for
6 The soya yield in Argentina is almost the same as in the USA and over 20% higher than the average of the other top 5
exporters (USDA: 2010).
7 USDA. Northern Argentina Production Potential Continues to Grow. Foreign Agricultural Services. 2010 http://
www.pecad.fas.usda.gov/highlights/2010/06/Argentina/2010jun24publictravelmcwill.pdf/ (acceded April 2012).
8 Today, Argentina is the world’s second largest producer of GM crops after the USA. GM crops (e.g. soya, corn and
cotton) cover a total area of 22 million ha.
9 ‘Brazilian farmers bought the illegal seeds (from Argentina) on such a scale that the official ban on GMOs became
meaningless and was revoked by President Lula. Similar tactics were used to spread RR soya into Paraguay and Bolivia’.
(GRAIN, 2009)
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the massive and rapid expansion of ‘illegal’ transgenic soya beans. Soya is now the main export
crop of Brazil and Paraguay and is one of the largest in weight in Bolivia and Uruguay, leading
to their nickname ‘Repúblicas unidas de la soja’.
2.1. The technology frontier
Following its introduction in 1996, GM soya spread rapidly throughout the continent. Large
companies started to expand production by leasing land from small and medium-sized
producers. Expansion began in the core Pampean region and is now moving towards the north,
and even into and from Brazil, and into Paraguay, Uruguay and Bolivia in a trans-regional
capital move [2], in order to reduce climate risks. Brazilian soya entrepreneurs (such as the
Brazilian ‘king of soya’, the Andre Maggi group) are now purchasing land in Argentina,
arguing that some costs are cheaper there. And soya growers in Paraguay – mostly Brazilian
migrants or their descendants (the brasiguayos) – are expanding their soya plantations into the
Paraguayan Chaco region, since they realize that the original production area in eastern
Paraguay is reaching its limits.
At the same time, there are clear indications that the GM soya frontier is likely to move across
the Atlantic towards Africa, where ‘bridges’ between countries such as Brazil and Mozambique
are the starting points for connections to bring in know-how, machinery and GM technologies,
and to increased interest in African land. Argentina’s machinery producers and land specu‐
lators are unlikely to miss out on this business opportunity.
The production of GM soya expanded at a breakneck pace: in 1997–99, the area expand‐
ed by an average of 2 million ha per year. In 2002, Roundup Ready soya beans already
accounted for 99 per cent of total  soya production. The attraction of using GM soya in‐
stead of conventional soya was based not so much on yields (the productivity of conven‐
tional varieties is sometime higher), as on the compatibility with no-tilling systems, easy
field operations and the simplicity of weed management.11 The new GM seeds facilitated
pest control over large areas of land and made expansion much more viable.  The intro‐
duction of GM soya, however, made producers highly dependent on herbicides and fer‐
tilizers.  This  resulted in the rapid increase in  herbicide use,  raising questions about  the
economic and environmental sustainability of this production system.
With the massive introduction of the GM soya technological package, this production model
started to expand towards areas that had not been considered suitable for agriculture.
Examples are Argentina’s northeast and the Chaco region, which are vulnerable in both
environmental and social terms [3, 4]. Due to new technologies and soft innovations, such as
new management models (introducing sowing pools and the leasing of land by extra-regional
farmers), the soya frontier shifted towards semiarid areas, such as the Chaco region.12 In the
10 GRAIN, Las consecuencias inevitables de un modelo genocida y ecocida. 2009. http://www.grain.org/article/entries/
1232-las-consecuencias-inevitables-de-un-modelo-genocida-y-ecocida/ (accessed 30 January 2011).
11 Benbrook, C. Rust, resistance, run-down soils and rising costs. Problems facing soya bean producers in Argentina.
Technical  Paper  no.  8.  Benbrook  Consulting  Services  &  Ag  BioTechInfoNet.  2005.  http://www.greenpeace.de/
fileadmin/gpd/user_upload/themen/gentechnik/Benbrook-StudieEngl.pdf/ (accessed 30 October 2011).
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last 50 years, 2 million ha of forest have been cut in the centre and south of this region for the
cultivation of cotton and soya, leading to environmental degradation.
After its introduction, the use of the GM soya technological package expanded very quickly.
Technology has become a tool to control access to land, based on techno-fix approaches to
sustainability.13 In Argentina, the total soya bean area has expanded more than that of any
other crop since 1996, and especially since the introduction of direct tilling techniques and
Roundup (glyphosate) Resistant soya, combined with the intensive use of fertilizers and
agrochemicals. This technological innovation made soya cultivation economically feasible,
even in agro-ecological zones where soya beans would not grow before. The combination in
one package of direct tillage techniques and machinery with Roundup Ready soya is funda‐
mental for expansion to other ecological regions out of the core areas.
In  addition,  a  new way of  organizing  production  through planting  management  pools,
machinery and labour contractors, and storage facilities, allowed decreasing costs through
the scaling of production, which in turn generated even more incentives for territorial ex‐
pansion [5]. Production is increasingly becoming large scale, because medium and small‐
er  producers  are  unable  to  make  the  required  investments  in  technological  innovation
(new seeds, agrochemicals, less crop rotation, tendency to monoculture and less sustaina‐
ble  agricultural  practices).  By  applying  techno-fix  solutions,  large-scale  enterprises  have
better possibilities to ‘correct’ environmental and social costs, which they consider exter‐
nalities of the business model.
In conclusion, technological innovation (direct tillage plus genetically modified glyphosate
resistant soya) in Argentina has changed the way in and scale at which land can be devoted
to a single crop, cultivated in large production units, and managed by few hands and with
almost no human labour. Interested actors, such as seed and agrochemical multinationals, have
actively promoted this model, with the paradigmatic case of Monsanto allowing Argentinean
farmers to produce and multiply GM soya without paying royalties and for years ignoring the
illegal distribution of the seed across the South American region. The commercialization of
Monsanto RR soya and such inputs as glyphosate was authorized in obscure circumstances
by the secretary of Agriculture in 1996: the scientific evaluations were performed by directly
interested private actors and there was no public debate. The report from the secretary of
Agriculture – which did not include a biosafety assessment, was not made public and lacked
a peer-reviewed assessment – was approved in just 81 days, and included a large section in
English written by Monsanto [6, 7]. Other regions are going to be opened for soya production
through biotechnological innovation. For instance, the Obispo Colombres Experimental
Station14 is working on biotech soya development and the improvement of farmers’ practices
in the northwest region of the country [7]. As a result, yields have improved in this region, and
storage facilities and crushing facilities are moving up north. It shows that technological
12 46% of the Chaco belongs to Argentina, 34% to Paraguay (3 departments) and 20% to Bolivia (3 departments).
13 Levidow, L., Papaioannou, T. Innovation narratives in European agricultural research,Crepe research reports. 2010.
http://crepeweb.net/?page_id=339/ (accessed November 2010).
14 Estación Experimental Agroindustrial Obispo Colombres is an autonomous entity of the Ministerio de Desarrollo‐
Productivo del Gobierno de Tucumán.
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innovation is a key factor in the advance of the agricultural frontier, allowing GM soya to be
produced on various types of land and in various climates.
2.2. The land frontier
While it is widely acknowledged that international prices plus technology innovation were
responsible for the expansion of soya into the ‘marginal’ lands of the Chaco region, other factors
are also responsible for the rapid expansion of the soya frontier. It was not just the combination
in a single package of the application of zero-tillage techniques and glyphosate-resistant soya
seeds developed by the multinational Monsanto; it was also the fact that when the new
technology appeared, large areas of underused hacienda land were available in the pampas
for new and relatively quick occupation, and that extra-sector financial capital was ready to
be invested.
There had for a long time (including during the period of import substitution industrialization)
been a decreasing interest in farmland in Argentina; large areas of latifundia land (land reforms
have never taken place there) were increasingly abandoned, and especially in the 1990s people
lost interest in farming; capital flowed to the industrial and other sectors, especially after 1991,
when in the context of the Washington Consensus, interest in agricultural production de‐
creased. The national grain board (Junta Nacional de Granos) was closed, putting an end to
state support to the agricultural sector.
It was in this context of the widespread availability of ‘underused’ land that technological
innovation took place. Large companies and investment funds took the initiative of organizing
‘sowing pools’, establishing and managing the use of the technological package, controlling
large tracts of land and starting to control the whole production chain, based on the previous
dissemination of direct-tillage technologies among producers. It is the combination of this new
form of organization (sowing pools), technological innovation (direct tillage, GM seeds) and
the availability of large areas of unused land that explain the rapid expansion of soya produc‐
tion in the Pampas region. In the core area provinces like Santa Fe – the cradle of direct tillage
– soya production advanced [rapidly, on the basis of land leases to achieve scale.]
This rapid expansion pushed annual crops and cattle ranching out of the Pampean region. In
the Chaco region, deforestation also increased rapidly, due to the displacement of cattle raising
to northern provinces and direct investments in land clearing for new soya plantations. This
was accompanied by social conflicts, since the area was occupied by smallholders (peasants)
and indigenous groups. By the end of the 1990s, high international soya bean prices and the
saturation of the core area led to shifts in the investment pattern, namely from the Pampean
region to the northwest of the country and into the Chaco forest, to acquire land for soya
production, through either land-use change or the clearing of native forests.15 According to
Benbrook [6], between 1996 (when GM soya was legalized) and 2004, 32 per cent of the
expansion of soya plantations in Argentina took place on land previously used for other crops,
15 Slutzky, D. Situaciones Problemáticas de Tenencia de la Tierra en Argentina, Prodinder, 2008.http://www.proind‐
er.gov.ar/productos/Biblioteca/contenidos/estinv.14.situaciones% 20problematicas% 20de% 20tenencia% 20de% 20la%
20tierra.pdf/ (accessed June 2011).
Biofuels - Economy, Environment and Sustainability78
27 per cent on former pastures and hay fields, and 41 per cent on newly cleared forest and
savannah.
Figure 2. Argentina. Current soya producing provinces
Whereas soya expansion was realized in the pampas region without major transformations in
property relationships, the situation was very different in the Chaco region. Here, the expan‐
sion was accompanied by large-scale land transfers, the purchase of large areas of land at
‘nonsense’ prices [8] and the converting new land into agricultural land. In the northwest of
Argentina, soya expansion was horizontal; the cultivated area grew by 48 per cent between
1988 and 2002, especially in the provinces of Santiago del Estero and Salta, where the agricul‐
tural area doubled between 1988 and 2008 [9]. In both provinces, this process led to the
destruction of native forestland (that had carob and quebracho trees) and to the end of small-
scale farming, which had mainly been developed on land occupied by peasants, familiy
producers and indigenous groups who lacked legal land titles. The possession and indigenous
territory status compete with commercial pressure on this land, causing tensions and often
even open conflicts with local land dwellers, and former land use was replaced by soya or
livestock.
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Because of the boom, soya bean producers in the Pampas, who already controlled the land in
this area through ownership or management, made good money. Many of them decided to
use their profits to purchase or lease additional land in the northern regions. It is therefore
mainly the successful producers from the pampas provinces, such as Buenos Aires, Córdoba
and Santa Fe, who are now buying land in the northern provinces, such as Santiago de Estero.
Since land users in this area often do not hold legal land titles, land transfers are fairly easy
and can depend on different mechanisms of shifting land control. For investors, in terms of
opportunity costs, the purchase or occupation through fraudulent or legal eviction of relatively
cheap land compensates for unstable yields, the cost of vegetation clearance and higher
transport costs. The combination of ownership and other forms of access to land, such as lease
contracts, continued to increase nationally by 25 per cent in the period 1988–2002, and these
mixed forms, which are typical of the Pampean region, also are becoming more common in
the Chaco region. The process has been described as the ‘pampeanization of the Chaco’, and
allows new players that were already present in the nucleus region to produce in larger units.
‘Accidental contracts’ in particular have been instrumental as a strategy to enlarge the
production units for soya bean and wheat, sunflower and livestock. Thus, the expansion of
agriculture, and particularly livestock and soya, is linked not necessarily to large properties
in the cadastral sense, but to large production units. Between 1988 and 2002, the agricultural
area increased by 15 per cent in the whole country and but 50.3 per cent in the regions outside
the pampas.
Besides the ‘soyization’ of the pampas and the ‘agriculturization’ of the Chaco region, which
has brought soya into the forests and onto the land of indigenous groups and peasants, there
is a third development taking place: the growth of cattle raising as a result of displacement
from the pampas to other regions. In the province of Santiago del Estero, the dynamics of the
land market set in train by the ‘soya boom’ at the end of the 1990s, soon left new investors with
no ‘empty’ land for agriculture. Financial operations with land during the soya boom (2002–
07) were among private buyers and sellers, and large-scale soya plantations were relatively
easily developed since this land was the best in the province (mainly because of the availability
of water); it was easily controlled and accessed through purchase and, if necessary, easily
cleared, since forest protection and territorial planning legislation was not yet in place.
However, once the way had been paved by soya, cattle ranching activities also increased,
mainly on the remaining land, which was considered ‘marginal’ (or not so apt for agriculture)
and was in general inhabited by holders with possession or territorial rights. In other words,
soya expansion led to both a push and a pull process of cattle raising. These combined processes
are reflected in a 2 per cent increase in the cattle population of the northern region. As a result,
Santiago del Estero is one of the most affected provinces in terms of land-use change and the
arrival of investors from other provinces. Its cattle herd increased by 40 per cent between 1988
and 2002 [10].
At the beginning of the soya era, individual entrepreneurs could afford to invest in land in the
Chaco region. But prices in the increasingly dynamic land market recently rose so high that
larger extra-provincial and extra-regional companies, investment pools and foreign investors
have displaced local capital on the demand side. Even with rising land prices, pools are still
Biofuels - Economy, Environment and Sustainability80
able to invest in estates of 40–50 thousand ha. In many cases, these are only speculative
investment funds, which acquire land in order to rent it out. Those who lead this process are
mainly producers from the Pampean region such as Buenos Aires, Cordoba and Santa Fe. The
investors find cheaper land, less regulation than in the Pampean region, and small producers
with precarious tenure situations. Developing land in the Chaco region is expensive, because
of deforestation, transport, irregular yields due to climate instability and the need to deal with
conflicts with the holders of possession rights; nevertheless, it seems that cheap prices and
short-term benefits compensate for these costs.
Although evidence shows that both rent and purchase land prices have been rising consid‐
erably in the last few years.
To sum up, the consolidation of the GM soya hegemony in Argentina’s Pampean region
displaced traditional cattle ranching to the north. But GM soya also made inroads into the
Chaco forests, because the availability of cheap land, a lack of regulation and the underlying
myth of ‘empty land’ [11]16 attracted new actors, such as real estate speculators, cattle growers
and soya producers into the monte, including those of local, extra-regional and international
origin. In territorial terms, soya has occupied the region’s more productive land; it arrived in
the early 2000s, in a violent and massive way, and in many cases at the expense of the forest,
peasants’ land and the monte. In general, extra-regional investors, with local connections
especially in the field of technical support, have dominated the soyization of the Chaco. In
general, the areas targeted for soya investments were easily accessible through purchase, while
land conversion was carried out through the deforestation of vast areas, not necessarily empty
but probably difficult to control by locals, even if they held rights to the land. The relationship
with the local people was, in fact, less personalized; investors were generally represented by
managers, which has both advantages and disadvantages when it comes to conflicts with the
local communities and individuals with weak tenure rights.
2.3. Actors and interest groups
Thus, new frontiers of expansion are leading to new forms of land control, and to new actors
and new types of alliances and relations among them. During the neoliberal period, medium-
and large-scale farmers tried to alleviate the crisis by leasing land within and outside the core
area to increase the size of their farms and the productivity of fixed factors using zero-tillage
(siembra directa) techniques. Others were in a worse situation and were forced to rent out their
land to those with the investment capacity. In order to minimize production costs, producers
needed to use adequate technology. However, not all agricultural producers were able to
incorporate new technology and upscale their level of operation. The indebted small farmer
had no chance. Thus, a new type of actor appeared: the small renters, namely farmers who
rent out their land to pools (contratistas) or to other landowners. This explains the rise of larger
holdings through ‘accidental’ lease contracts (3 years). In this sense, there is a process of capital
concentration rather than land concentration.
16 GAIA Foundation, Biofuelwatch, The African Biodiversity Network, Salva La Selva, Watch Indonesia, EconNexus,
Agrofuel and the myth of marginal land. http://www.cbd.int/doc/biofuel/Econexus% 20Briefing% 20AgrofuelsMargi‐
nalMyth.pdf/ (accessed 19 November 2009).
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Larger producers are those that can better address the costs through economies of scale, since
the input sellers and traders who buy their grain have oligopolistic positions in the market.
The purchasing power of larger producers allows them to get better input prices and cheaper
access to transport access, as well as to store their production while awaiting better prices, and
to reduce climate risks by producing in different geographical areas. Thus, small and medium-
sized producers are ceding control over their production unit to other actors, such as larger
landowners, contractors and sowing pools (pools de siembra). Actors that had different or even
opposed interests in the past, now found a reason to establish an alliance, especially when
political struggles against market regulation were perceived as necessary. The decrease in
production units between 1988 and 2002 was mainly due to these processes of land cession
(about 50,000 production units of less than 101 ha) and scaling up. The sector of small renters
is now earning around 5–6 times more than they earned when they were producers. Apart
from these changes in land tenure, GM soya development would not have been possible
without the role of actors devoted to the dissemination and adoption of new technologies. This
is the case of the direct-tillage system that was widely promoted by AAPRESID within
Argentina, and that at the moment is lobbying to disseminate it globally, under the label of
sustainability.
The following table presents more detail about the range of actors and interest groups in the
soya sector.
Land based – traditional
actors
Description Example
Traditional large land owners Abandon cattle growing activities and commence
financial speculation
Invest in modernized agriculture – technology
package







producers (> 500 ha)
Increase the area of the land they rent to others
(small, medium).
Persisting
Producers on 200–500 ha
Producers on < 200 ha
Land based – new actors
Small renters (many of them
in the group on < 200 ha)
Survived disappearance of 50,000 producers in
the 1990s
Now get 5–6 times their income as producers just
by renting out their land
Mainly in the pampas region
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Land based – traditional
actors
Description Example
New large owners coming
from industrial sector
Invest in activities based on the foreignization of
their industries in the agricultural sector.
> 100,000 ha
Expanding
Ratazzi, Terrabusi, Blanco Villegas
Absentee owners Years later, they or their heirs claim land that is in
the hands of occupants.
Some falsely claim to be absentee owners
Investment groups, trusts
and sowing pools
From within and outside the agricultural sector.
They work as investment funds.
Rent land and manage it, and distribute benefits
at the end of each agricultural cycle.
Diversify production regions and contract
machinery and services to avoid risks.
Also work with foreign investors
Expanding into Mercosur
Los Grobo, El Tejar,
Cazenave, MSU-Uribelarrea,
Lartirigoyen
Foreign investors in land Comparatively cheap land, especially in the
northeast and northwest





Real estate intermediaries &
land speculators
Buy cheap land (sometimes from possessors and
then get the titles) and sell it at a higher price
Machinery contractors
(contratistas)
Machinery and services for planting, fumigation
and harvest in return for a share of production
(used to be individuals, now a growing share of
capitalized companies)
Machinery producers Increasingly concentrated and globalized with
transnational and local actors.




Buy the soya beans from producers and find a
buyer. Deal with 80% of the production and large
part of the value paid by exporters.
They play an important role in ensuring the
conservation and grain quality and supporting
the business strategies of producers, allowing
them to decide when to sell the crop
Role in technical assistance and financing the
producer
Aceitera General Deheza SACIC is one
of the
most important.
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Land based – traditional
actors
Description Example
Biodiesel companies This is a growing sector but there is already a
large capacity installed
The 45% of the internal quota
of biodiesel in hands of: UnitedBio,
Viluco, Explora and Diaser.
The remaining 55% goes
to 15 companies, including Rosario
Bioenergy,
Biomadero and AOM
Input sellers Few big transnationals selling seeds and some
domestic companies. In the field of
agrochemicals, the monopoly of Monsanto.
Seeds TNCs: Monsanto, Pioneer,
Novartis, DuPont, Ciba
Agrochemicas: Monsanto
Technical Assistance Important role of the private sector
Also transnationals providing inputs
AAPRESID (Argentinean Direct Tillage
Producers Association)




Exporters Buy soya beans and derivatives from producers,
collectors and industry
Fewer than 10 companies concentrate all exports
of the chain
Exporter condition industry, collection-storage,
inputs selling and producers
83% soya beans exported by Cargill,
Noble Argentina,
ADM, Bunge, LDC-Dreyfus, AC
Toepfer and Nidera.
82% soya oil exported by Bunge, LDC-
Dreyfus,
Cargill, ADG and Molinos Río de la
Plata
90% other soya derivatives are
exported by
Cargill, Bunge, Dreyfus, AGD, Vicentín
and
Molinos Río de la Plata
*Sources: [12], [13], [14] and [15], and own elaboration.
Table 1. Actors and interest groups in the Argentinean soya sector*
2.4. The state: An actor again?
While soya expansion is promoted in the region as a ‘green’ way of increasing foreign currency
reserves and boosting rural development and energy self-sufficiency, it is well documented
that monoculture expansion is bringing about land-use change and the expansion of the
agricultural frontier, which is advancing through the Chaco rainforest, small-scale farms and
Biofuels - Economy, Environment and Sustainability84
indigenous communities, displacing food, cattle and regional crops production and leading
to deforestation.
If we consider the state as an actor (which, of course, has analytical implications), in the case
of Argentina – and in that of other Latin American countries – the state has returned to centre
stage. The Kirchners’ administrations era from 2003 to the present day have had a lot to do
with re-establishing the power of the national state and its political initiative, and getting the
country out of one of its deepest crises by taking progressive measures and in many cases
reversing many of the neoliberal achievements. To some extent, the main success of this
administration has been to give space back to politics, that is, introducing into the usual work
of state institutions debates that were not widely discussed in society. Nevertheless, in the
fields of rural development and the regulation of extractive activities (e.g. mining, forestry and
soya monoculture), the state has failed in many ways and has acted only to create economic
incentives for the further expansion of these activities. It has not properly addressed regula‐
tions for sustainability or protected rights.
First of all, the soya boom, and the income from export taxes, was used by the government to
pay the external debt and provide social aid in the struggle against indigence, poverty and
unemployment, in a period when more than half of the population was living below the
poverty line. The main active policy measures to promote the development of the GM soya
model were taken in the 1990s (when the government was openly neoliberal), namely through
the Deregulation Decree in 1991, privatization, liberalization of the market and the liberaliza‐
tion of transgenic soya in 1996, giving impulse to its generalized expansion and the consoli‐
dation of the agribusiness model. After that, apart from the export taxes regime, state policy
in relation to the expansion of the GM soya model was a complete laissez-faire, within which
the agribusiness started to gain public technical and scientific knowledge arenas (such as
INTA, SENASA and some areas of CONICET) as well as winning the battle of common sense
in relation to the question which rural development path was desirable. Even when the
government tried to be active in imposing a mobile export taxes system in 2008 that implied
an increase in costs for producers, Cristina Kirchner faced the fierce opposition of the entire
soya sector and a part of urban middle classes.
Nevertheless, in the last few years increasing awareness of the negative impacts of the
development model – which had been denounced for years by social movements and NGOs
– started to attract media interest, as well as spaces within, or in dialogue with, the state.
Although with limited scope, the fact that the state is regaining the initiative in executive,
legislative and judicial matters opens possibilities for regulation, whereas before there was
only the market. With the conflict between the government and the soya-producing sector of
2008 over export rights, the hegemony and the problems involved in the soya model were put
up for public discussion, albeit with many limitations, contradictions and omissions. While
this conflict over who should benefit and how to distribute the income from soya exports was
going on, another sector was ignored: campesino economies, the indigenous communities and
the producers for the domestic food market, which are still not a target for rural development
and agricultural policies.
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3. Constructing a biodiesel market and sector: a new frontier of
profitability?
The creation of a biofuels market through policies such as the European directive on biofuels
is perceived by the governments of South American countries, as well as by actors in the
production chain of soya, as an opportunity to diversify products and markets. In the Argen‐
tine case, the conditions for biodiesel production are already in place due to the existence of a
highly efficient, integrated soya sector [16], which is mainly dominated by domestic and
transnational industry players and traders. Biodiesel can be produced from the same biomass
that produces soya oil and meal, and is highly dependent on an industrialized agriculture that
is able to homogenize raw material for processing into the various by-products [17]. Argentina
meets these conditions. Discourses justifying these policies refer to objectives such as diversi‐
fying the energy supply, environmental protection and rural development. In South America
and in Europe, promotional discourses do not differ radically from these discourses, although
they are much more centred on energy diversification and economic development – but not
necessarily of rural areas.
Global drivers of GM soya expansion in South America are clearly related to the growing
demand for animal protein food in Europe (and more recently also in China and other Asian
countries), which demands large amounts of soya oil. In 2006, MERCOSUR member countries
(Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela) signed a memorandum of under‐
standing to encourage and promote biofuel production and consumption. The creation of a
new biofuel market in the EU that will depend on Southern countries to reach the blending
targets, opens a space for Argentinean biodiesel exports.17 In this sense, the Argentinean
authorities have been keen on setting policies with the aim of domestically creating value
added and reduce energy imports, such as a differential export tax to promote biofuel
development beyond domestic consumption, which is also being stimulated by compulsory
mix quotas and presented as an alternative use for soya and thus diversifying markets.
Measures to stimulate the production of biofuels have been aggressively lobbied for by the
domestic soya bean sector. Therefore, on the domestic side, there is a huge demand for biofuel
also in Argentina. Nevertheless, because the large companies are not interested in a domestic
biofuels sector, most of the biodiesel produced by them, and the majority of total biodiesel
production, continues to go to export markets, meaning that the land in Argentina continues
to produce products that the population does not consume.
However, the tendency changed when the Argentine government promoted the creation of a
domestic market, and thereby encouraged the soya sector to diversify, through Law 26.093
(2006), through which it established blending targets of 5 per cent for 2010, 7 per cent in 2011
and with the expectation of increasing it to 10 per cent in the next years. The exported volume
started to decrease as long as the new policy was implemented. Most exports go to Europe;
Spain is the main buyer. Today, 15–20 per cent of the soya bean crop in Argentina is used to
17 Friends of the Earth International. Fuelling destruction in Latin America – the real price of agrofuels 2008. http://
www.foei.org/en/resources/publications/pdfs/2008/biofuels-fuelling-destruction-latinamerica/view/ (accessed January
2009).
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produce biodiesel.18 Investments in the sector have been growing since 2006 in the expectation
of increasing exports and market diversification. Most of the investments in the biodiesel
industry come from the usual big players in the international soya sector [25], such as Glencore,
Nidera and Dreyfus, Bunge and Cargill, with alliances with the powerful domestic soya-
processing sector and financial investors. To encourage investments in the biodiesel industry,
the national government imposed a differential export tax that favours the production of
biofuels over soya oil and meal (the difference is more than 17 percentage points). Local
governments also encourage investments by providing tax exemptions. Prior to the legislation
in Argentina, there was almost no domestic demand for products from soya beans, which made
it difficult to justify a paradox for many defenders of the oilseed. However, the taxes on soya
exports are estimated to account for around 12.5 per cent of the national budget [16].
The supply of seeds continues to be dominated by Monsanto and Syngenta, along with some
big local companies. As mentioned, the dominant players in the biodiesel sector are the big
transnational and domestic corporations that have dominated the soya sector for many years.
They control about 80 per cent of the sector and in many cases integrate production and
processing. As a subsector within the soya sector,19 the biodiesel industry is a rather clustered
sector at the cultivation and processing levels [16], since many of the domestic actors are located
in the same geographical area, that is, around the Paraná river. But the domestic biofuels sector
is also very dependent on international networks [16, 18].
Legislation and incentives
Argentina ● Law 26.093 Compulsory biofuels blending (2006)
● National Bioenergy programme
● Differential export taxes vis-à-vis soya oil
● Native Forests Law 26.331 (2007)
● CARBIO voluntary certification scheme presented to EU
● INTA: biofuels research
Table 2. Biodiesel promotion in Argentina
While additional demand for soya may lead to the further expansion of the agricultural frontier
– exacerbating the social and environmental problems resulting from both past and current
GM soya cultivation, and commercial pressures on land in the Chaco region – recent central
government measures and an increasing conflict with EU import markets, put some question
marks and bring contradiction to the biodiesel sector in Argentina. A recent announcement by
18 USDA Foreign Agricultural Services (2011) Global Agriculture Information Network Report, Argentina, Biofuels
Annual 2011. http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent% 20GAIN% 20Publications/Biofuels% 20Annual_Buenos% 20Aires_Ar‐
gentina_7-8-2011.pdf/ (accessed July 2012).
19 Actors from the soya sector particularly involved in the biodiesel promotion and production are: sowing pools, large
farmers, renters, international agribusiness companies, vegetable oil refiners, service contractors, transport, storage/
collection, biotechnology multinationals (seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, etc.), traders/exporters, processing industry (oil,
meal, biodiesel), machinery input providers, research institutions (public and private) and business associations
(AAPRESID, ACREA, CARBIO, ACSOJA, Comisión de Enlace).
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Spain (the buyer of 70 per cent of all Argentinean biodiesel exports) that it would prohibit
biodiesel imports from outside the EU, led Argentina to complain to the WTO. At the same
time, the national government raised the taxes on biodiesel exports to the level of the other
soya by-products, thereby changing the thrust of the main promotional policy. This seems to
be exacerbated by the 15 per cent reduction in the price of biodiesel for the domestic market,
which has negative impacts on medium and smaller non-integrated enterprises. Still the EU
had been denouncing Argentinean dumping, through tax exemptions, and claiming the
existence of more efficient biofuels from rapeseed and palm oil. In consequence, due to both
national and international factors, there is uncertainty about the future of the biodiesel sector.
4. Main impacts of, and dilemmas posed by the expanding GM soya
frontier in relation to sustainability, governance and development
The  economy  has  recently  been  working  quite  well  for  the  actors  and  interest  groups
linked to  the  soya  and biodiesel  industries.  But  the  impacts  of  the  dynamics  emerging
from the GM soya sector also have implications for rural actors that are not part of the
production and distribution chain.  In areas outside the core region,  where soya has be‐
come rather hegemonic,  other rural dwellers find their access to land, water and forests
affected by the GM soya pressure.
4.1. Sustainable development for whom?
The rapid expansion of soya monoculture in the Argentinean Chaco region implies massive
land-use changes and pressure on land whose users have weak tenure rights, or on land that
is being claimed by different actors, such as companies, campesinos, indigenous communities
and landless workers. The tensions lead to claims for the regularization of possession and
indigenous rights. The problems arise because in the Argentinean Chaco provinces a larger
number of peasants do not hold titles to the land they occupy and work on. For instance, around
75 per cent of peasants in Santiago del Estero are in this situation. Different mechanisms of
pressure on the indigenous and peasant population as well as mechanisms of enclosure occur.
These include violent evictions, unequal legal disputes, the pollution of water, soil and crops,
and the clearance of forests, which are sources of livelihoods of the communities in the region.
The holders of possession rights are not so common in the Pampas, but are still a very relevant
population in the northern provinces and, together with the indigenous communities, are the
groups that find their access to land threatened or increasingly controlled by more powerful
local, translocal and foreign actors. In particular, holders of possession rights have become
vulnerable to commercial pressure on the land they occupy. As for this group, the mechanism
to acquire land from them could imply the purchase of possession rights, which presents an
advantage to the buyer who pays a price that is considerably under market value, since there
are no property titles. A common situation that these holders face in most of the northern
provinces, as well as in some areas of the core region, is the appearance of absentee owners or
their descendants who claim ownership of land that have been occupied for decades by
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families, including former workers of the owners who got paid in land rather than receiving
a salary. The expansion of the frontier only speeds up this process, since the price of formerly
‘unproductive’ land rises, attracting not only new land users but also speculators.
Mention should also be made of swindling by dubious land claimants and of the fact that some
of the holders of possession rights lose their access to land through direct displacement and
enclosure. We observed in Santiago del Estero the use of lies, deceptive contracts and proce‐
dures, and intimidation and violence. In this sense, also comodato contracts imply only the
beginning of the story or the process of gaining access, which can continue until the possessor
leaves the land – perhaps still believing that he had no option but to cede the land. There are
a range of situations between the extremes, such as ex-possession rights holders paying a rent
to the new land user to raise cattle on the land they had lived on for decades. Incidentally,
intimidation and threats occur not only in the Chaco region, but also in other areas, as
Roodhuyzen (2010) showed for the islanders in the Argentinean Delta region.
The  national  campesino–indigenous  movement  (MNCI–Via  Campesina)  estimates  that
around 200,000 rural families have been forced off their land due to the advance of soya.
The provinces where this process has been the most violent are Santiago del Estero and
Córdoba,  where  heavy  machinery  owned by  sowing pools  and landowners  drove  over
peasants’  houses and parcels.  REDAF documented that around 950,000 people – inhabi‐
tants of indigenous and campesino territories – are affected by land or environmental con‐
flicts related to the expansion of the agricultural frontier, led by GM soya. Most of these
conflicts began in 2000, when the GM soya model reached its height [22]. Many of these
groups were  occupants  and holders  of  possession rights  that,  according to  Argentinean
law, imply a form of tenure security. Possessors of these rights are occupants who have
been living on the land for more than 20 years and have performed ‘possession acts’, that
is,  they have worked on,  cared for  and improved the land.  If  these conditions are met,
they can virtually apply for land ownership. In the northern provinces these groups are
also threatened with the loss of access to the use of forests and common land for pasture.
Threats usually occur explicitly and with the use of physical and verbal violence, as has
been widely denounced by representatives of MOCASE.20  In other words, the consensus
that GM soya expansion had success in the core region seems to be contested at least in
Chaco provinces.  Here, tensions related to rights,  social organization, judicial and politi‐
cal strategies to defend them, and claims for the institutionalization of this defence, have
become a new space for land governance that might challenge dominant discourses legiti‐
mizing processes of the commoditization of land and the privatization of nature.
4.2. Environmental sustainability
Besides forest clearing for soya, there is also deforestation due to the incursion of cattle raising
into the forest of the Argentinean Chaco: the equivalent of 2500 football fields is occupied every
day. In Salta alone, 609,323 ha of forest disappeared between 1998 and 2006 (Greenpeace).
Córdoba is the province where the process is most devastating, followed by Santiago del Estero
20 MovimientoCampesino de Santiago del Estero.
The Drivers Behind the Rapid Expansion of Genetically Modified Soya Production into the Chaco Region of Argentina
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/53447
89
and Salta. This was particularly visible in the town of Tartagal, where violent floods occurred
between 2006 and 2009, leaving behind death, destruction and homeless families, particularly
indigenous families. According to local organizations there is a direct link between illegal
deforestation and climate change, which led to the floods. As forests make way for monocul‐
ture, the soil cannot absorb enough water; as a consequence, there are increasing river flows
and floods. Quite remarkable in this case is that expectations about the imminent implemen‐
tation of a Native Forests Law (Nº 26.331) aimed at protecting forest areas, led to deforestation
at an unprecedented speed, which was to blame for the violent flooding. Biodiversity is highly
affected by deforestation, and by the poisoning of water and soils with herbicides, such as the
massive application of glyphosate, which kills animals and microorganism, contaminates food
crops and affects people’s health. The excessive use of pesticides and little crop rotation turn
the soil sterile through the years.
In addition to environmental harm, several (mainly poor) communities in various towns and
cities in the main soya producing provinces in Argentina have been affected by serious health
problems caused by indiscriminate fumigation practices in areas neighbouring the plantations,
and in poor urban settlements where pesticides are stored. In 2003, Ituzaingó-Anexo reported
that the incidence of cancer in children was 50 per cent higher than the national average, which
was partly attributed to illegal fumigations in neighbouring GM soya fields. This diagnosis
pushed a group of mothers (Madres de Ituzaingó-Anexo) to organize themselves politically
and to make public their confrontation with local soya producers, by initiating legal actions
against fumigation with Roundup. This was a pioneer case in the country, one that served as
a precedent for many other localities where illegal fumigations had to be prohibited and legal
ones regulated.21
4.3. Development and governance
In connection with the advance of the agricultural frontier into bio-diverse and socially
vulnerable rain forests and savannahs [3, 4], we can observe the emergence of new actors and
the trans-location of actors who put into practice new forms of control over land and natural
resources with non-local capital. Translocal actors [19] have played and still play an important
role in introducing capital, technologies and modes of production and management, which
historically developed in the Pampas, into the Chaco region through the process of pampeani‐
zation. Some authors have put too much emphasis on the foreign character of the investments.
However, the case of Argentina clearly shows that for the moment the relevance of foreigni‐
zation is emblematic but not necessarily the mainstream, and that the role of the domestic and
translocal private sector is more important than we thought.
As for the government, the purely economic argument of not losing an opportunity has been
its leitmotiv and has led to the massive and unsustainable expansion of GM soya in the core
region. The lack of policy was justified by arguing that it is best not to put limits on the market.
The same type of argument was later used to justify laissez-faire policy with regard to the
21 In August 2012, the entrepreneur and pilot responsible for one of the cases of fumigation were taken to court, convicted
and put on probation. This has created a precedent for future legal processes.
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expansion into the Chaco region, allowing more powerful actors to impose their particular
interests and make them seem universal. In fact, not much has been done in Argentina to define
an agricultural policy for sustainable development. Associated measures were for a long time
aimed at supporting the dissemination of GM soya seeds and ignored the protection of the
rights of those with weak land rights (such as indigenous communities and holders of
possession rights), the protection of those affected by environmental harm and the protection
of the environment.
At the same time, Argentina, like some other Latin American countries, is becoming increas‐
ingly dependent on extractive activities (like GM soya cultivation), which are confronting the
country with a real development paradox. The case of soya, and particularly biodiesel, raises
questions regarding sustainability in a broader sense, since short-term economic development
objectives and enjoyment increasingly conflict with long-term man–land relations across
generations. In other words, the intrinsic logic of global capitalism makes national soya
producers follow market signs without paying attention to ecological and social precautions,
and the government opens the way to do that. It is therefore not surprising that the socio-
historical process of the introduction, promotion, adoption and expansion of GM soya in the
core region of Argentina determined to some extent the way in which the second phase of
expansion is taking place in the northern provinces, where the scale of the changes has been
much greater. Until 2007, tobacco and sugarcane competed with soya for land; however, soya
has become dominant in recent years and is expected to continue to expand more than those
other crops [3].22 The increased demand for land is and will be accompanied by accumulation,
privatization, enclosure and displacement [20, 21], redirecting resources away from local
communities as commodities for distant consumers.
As stated, the expansion of the agricultural frontier in the Chaco region has been an historically
ungoverned process. But if we consider governance as a synonym of control, different social
groups have controlled and benefited from this process in different phases, although it was
rather chaotic, with periods of land appropriation and others of land abandonment, and the
taking over by other groups. In other words, the drivers of the expansion of the agricultural
frontier into the Chaco were part of the process of governance. The public sector, however,
remained relatively inactive for more than 15 years, that is, after the liberalization of GM soya
in 1996. It was a way of acting that paved the way for development by letting it advance in an
unregulated manner. This does not mean that nothing was done. Quite significant public
resources were used to support scientific and technical public–private partnerships among
national institutions such as INTA and CONICET and private actors in the soya chain. In
addition, the taxation of crude soya exports did not address incentives to produce more, but
only triggered controversies over the distribution of benefits among private and public actors.
The national government has recently taken a more proactive role in relation to policies for
the agricultural sector, particularly with the launching of the new national PEA2 (Federal and
Participative Agro-food and Agribusiness Strategic Plan, 2010/2016), through which Argentina
seeks to achieve a privileged position as a global provider of food. The main goal is to increase
22 USDA (idem).
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the amount of agricultural land in production by 6 million ha, but the plan neglects the
existence of peasant production systems and excludes the Chaco region from the group defined
as fragile ecosystems. An active policy of disseminating the PEA across society would show
that it will seriously affect the future of rural people and the relationship between society and
nature in the long run. However, it is already giving positive signals to investors in industrial
agriculture and cattle raising. Moreover, some historically poor provinces that have been
neglected by the state have recently been targeted for the Historic Reparation Acts, which
include a range of infrastructural projects, many of them aimed at incorporating land to and
converting land for agriculture production, as was the case with the Figueroa dam, which was
built in 2011 to include 30,000 ha for agricultural and cattle production. Mention should also
be made of the IIRSA project aimed at constructing a new infrastructural network on the South
American continent, which will particularly affect the future of the South American Chaco
region as a whole.
The only national and provincial legislation aimed at reducing the negative impacts of frontier
expansion is the Forests Law (and the territorial planning measures linked to it), which deals
with the environmental dimension of the advancing agricultural frontier through forest
clearing. The results of territorial planning processes have so far been very heterogeneous in
different provinces and are still open to negotiation and contestation, while the capacity of this
type of regulation to protect vulnerable ecosystems has not been proven. At the same time, in
many northern provinces peasant and indigenous resistance to the advance of the agricultural
frontier has taken the form of a struggle organized around the recognition of possession rights,
in order to gain, maintain and control access to land. However, there is no policy to defend
the peasant production systems and their particular relation with the land against the social
and economic impacts of frontier expansion. This means that the tensions related to possession
rights, social organization, judicial and political strategies to defend peasants and claims for
the institutionalization of this defence have become a new field of land governance.
5. Conclusions
The expansion of soya production in Argentina developed relatively ungoverned and without
subsidies, through the initiatives of private interests in alliance with some state powers, which
left its regulation to market forces. The expansion started in the 1970s in the pampas region
where land and agriculture had gradually been abandoned during the period of ISI policies
and where it advanced at the expense of cattle raising and diversified grain production. In the
neoliberal period – when new production models (zero tillage) and new technology became
available (from 1996 onwards) – the expansion of soya took place more rapidly. This was
possible because large tracts of underused land were available and could easily be converted
into new production units by a limited number of old and new large landowners and investors,
who started to lease land. There was no major need for property change since flexible lease
contracts provided the necessary scale. In other words, there was a process of capital concen‐
tration rather than of land concentration. This, together with zero-tillage practices and
machinery, the introduction of GM soya (Roundup Ready (RR) resistant soya), and an
Biofuels - Economy, Environment and Sustainability92
innovative way of managing and organizing production by sowing pools, constituted the basis
for the soya boom.
The process that started in the pampas region was accompanied by crop change and the
migration of cattle farming towards the northern provinces, mainly the Chaco region. There,
direct investments in soya production were generally made by soya producers originating
from the pampas, since this group had succeeded in making good money from soya and
decided to buy additional land in the Chaco. New land users found cheaper land, less
regulation than in the Pampean region and small producers with precarious tenure situations.
Investing in the Chaco implied additional costs because of the need to clear vegetation, the
more expensive transport, irregular yields due to climate instability and conflicts with holders
of possession rights. However, cheap land and short-term benefits compensated for these costs.
The expansion of soya production in the pampas region did not lead to major changes in
landownership relations, and new alliances emerged among the actors. In the Chaco, however,
forests were cleared and local peasants and indigenous groups were bought out or were legally
or illegally displaced; they lost their land and were excluded from the benefits of soya growing.
Nevertheless, the state largely remained inactive in the fields of rural development and the
regulation of extractive activities, such as mining, forestry and soya monoculture. It acted only
in the sense that is created incentives for the further expansion of these activities. Regulation
for sustainability and the protection of the rights of local farmers has not been properly
addressed. Therefore, the main problems are the failure to implement the existing law and to
protect the rights of weaker interest groups, and the lack of a long-term vision regarding the
extent to which the use of glyphosate and other pesticides – which cause land degradation,
the contamination of other crops, water pollution, health problems, etc. – is compatible with
the need to bring about sustainable development.
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